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Chapter One 
Discovering the many Folds of Financial Inclusion 
 
I.a Introduction 
The recent literature has provided evidence on the groundbreaking role played by financial 
inclusion in enhancing the wellbeing of households and economic growth. This end is realized 
by enlarging access of the disadvantaged groups to basic financial services in the form of greater 
use of formal bank accounts, savings, and loans. However, the literature has overlooked the 
impact of the inclusive finance goal on the soundness of banks. In this respect, the suggested 
research aims at testing the relationship between financial inclusion and bank‟s credit risk, hence 
its stability. The findings in the literature suggest that banking stability is accomplished by 
availing financial services to households and Small to Medium Size Enterprise (SME‟s). The 
reason behind this is that it allows banks to diversify their credit portfolio, risk exposure, and 
reduction of non-performing loans (NPLs) specially when the borrowers are SMEs. Another 
positive feature is being a mechanism to lay down ample risk-free and cheap retail deposits. This 
could be employed as a leeway to decrease the reliance on volatile and often costly money 
market funding.  An inclusive banking sector tends to have a higher level of cost and profit 
efficiency. 
The rising voices demanding for more inclusive finance have remained persistent since the early 
2000‟s, and are a  consequence of empirical findings that financial inclusion efforts have positive 
effects on the alleviation of poverty in a country (Siddik & Kabiraj, 2018). In this respect, 
governments and central banks around the globe started to take initiatives and adopted new 
regulations to promote financial inclusion. Almost within the same time period, the recent global 
crises in 2007-2009 has compelled the world economies to embrace the concept of financial 
stability and emerge it as a policy priority (Siddik & Kabiraj, 2018). 
Financial inclusion programs aim to provide greater opportunity of access for formal financial 
services to the marginalized sectors of the community, which in turn foster economic 
development of a country (Hannig & Jansen, 2010). In this light, focusing on the access and 
usage dimension of financial inclusion, the former has been described as a course of action 
which ensures, firstly, the access to the formal system and secondly, providing well-timed and 
ample credit facilities to those in need for financial services including the weaker and the 
disadvantaged people of the country (Khan, 2011).  
Building on the access and usage aspect of financial inclusion, despite the fact that the 
groundbreaking initiative can improve citizens‟ social standard, as given by the bank‟s capacity 
to lend under the umbrella of financial inclusion to fund SME‟s and individuals‟ small 
businesses. The research community has remained skeptical about the impact of financial 
inclusion on banks' credit risk and hence their stability. 
Financial stability is conceptualized as the situation in which a financial system, consisting of 
financial markets, financial intermediaries, and market infrastructures is able to resist financial 
shocks, which are able to ruin the distribution of savings to lucrative investment alternatives. 
This would also mean, that financial stability is strongly allied to the risk diminution to the least 
intensity and resistance to shocks. Moreover, the concept of financial stability is likely to differ 
from developed to developing economies. In developed economies, financial stability is 
interpreted in the context of the state of non-financial institutions such as retirement funds, 
brokerage houses, investments funds, etc. Whereas in developing economies that comprise 
undeveloped stock markets, insurance companies, and investments into those countries mostly 
relying on bank loans. Henceforth, banks are the key pillars of financial stability and the gateway 
to economic stability (Popovska,2014). 
I.b Objectives of the Study 
Bearing in mind the virtues of financial inclusion and its ultimate goal in improving humanity's 
living standards. The goal that could be achieved by the delivery of financial services such as 
offerings loans to the underserved segment of the community, hence realizing suggested 
stability. Past contributions to the literature have overlooked the impact of introducing new 
customers to the official financial institutions by availing loans on banks' stability in specific and 
the entire national economy in general, making the outcomes yet ambiguous. In this regard, this 
study shall examine the impact of financial inclusion on banks credit risk in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region. In the light of having two opposing teams in the literature, the 
suggested research shall establish some answers to whether financial inclusion can positively or 
negatively impact the banks credit risk and hence stability. 
I.c Contribution to the Literature 
This thesis contributes to the current and relevant literature as follows: 
1. Past literature has covered areas pertaining to the expansion of loans to clients and the 
case of imprudent loan extension impact on the quality of lending standards. 
Furthermore, it highlighted aspects of non-performing loans and how they vary in 
respect to the amount of loans provided to the end customers and banks' management. 
The relevant literature has also covered cases where credit has been extended under 
financial inclusion programs and how banking products' diversification can reduce risk, 
thus, resulting in stability. However, this thesis shall contribute to the literature by 
identifying the impact of and the relationship between the most relevant financial 
inclusion indicators extracted from the World Bank's Financial inclusion database 
(FINDEX) and the credit risk illustrated by the ratio of the provision of loan losses to net 
loans. 
2. The thesis shall also inform financial regulators on how long till financial inclusion starts 
to take effect on credit risk.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter Two 
Financial Inclusion and Banks’ Credit Risk: Review of Relevant 
Literature 
 
II.a Conceptualizing Financial Inclusion in the Context of Previous Finance 
Theories 
Financial inclusion can be understood in the context of the finance growth theory. It creates a 
conducive ground for productivity and hence economic growth. According to Spratt (2013), 
realizing economic growth depends on the level of financial inclusion, composition, and stability 
of the financial intuitions. The increased demand for financial services cause the financial 
markets to evolve from a nascent economy. Henceforth, deepening financial inclusion is an 
illustration of growth in other sectors of the economy and for financial institutions to support 
financial inclusion, they must be financial stable. 
The effect of financial inclusion on bank credit risk has also been explained in context of 
Akerlof‟s financial asymmetry theory (1970). Boffondi and Gobbi (2003), perceive adverse 
selection to occur when a lender cannot differentiate between borrowers of different risks when 
loan contracts are limited. This leads to borrowers repaying loans when they have the mean to do 
so, triggering the accumulation of non-performing loans (Boffondi & Gobbi, 2003). Hanning and 
Jansen (2010) characterize financial inclusion by the entry of new, inexperienced and numerous 
customers into the formal financial sector including commercial banks. This creates an obstacle 
in the debt markets, as lenders have difficulties in deciding whether the customer is a good risk 
which menaces financial performance and hence stability. Therefore, it is challenging for banks 
to establish whether financial inclusion is a low risk good investment or otherwise (Hanning & 
Jansen, 2010). According to Richard (2011), moral hazard and adverse selection resulting from 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders can instigate contraction in credit and 
hence affecting performance and stability. Moral hazard occurs when a party to a transaction 
provides misleading information about its assets, liabilities or credit capacity. This is noted to be 
contributing to non-performing loans.  
The theory by Diamond (1984) on financial intermediation has been deployed to establish a link 
between financial inclusion and bank credit risk. Diamond explains that banks act as 
intermediaries between borrowers and savers. As financial middlemen, banks avail access, 
financial diversification, and financial utilization. The degree of inclusion has an influence on the 
level of stability as substantiated by the literature. Diamond also points out that banks are able to 
effectively monitor borrowers and thus play the role of delegated monitoring. Reducing 
monitoring costs have significant impact on competitive advantage.  Ndebbio (2004) regards 
financial intermediation as the extent to which financial institutions bring deficit spending units 
and surplus spending units together.  
II.b Financial Inclusion Concept from Opponents to Advocates   
The literature on the relationship between financial inclusion and banks' credit risk is scarce and 
presents mixed evidence. Some scholars have concluded a negative influence of financial 
inclusion on banks' riskiness, while other have reached results supporting the positivity of 
financial inclusion on banks' risk and stability. These mixed results incent researchers to further 
explore and reach robust answers on the nature of this relationship.    
Commenting on aspects of banks' management, Espinoza and Prasad (2010) found that 
promoting size increase in loans can have a lagged effect on non-performing loans. This makes it 
difficult for bank managers to deal with the repercussions of credit risk in time (Espinoza & 
Prasad, 2010). Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas (2012) have delivered a view of bank determinants. 
They concluded that non-performing loans are significantly promoted by the quality of bank 
management (Louzis et al., 2012). Gosh (2015) has referred to the strong relationship between 
the liquidity of risk, asset size, and cost efficiency of the banking sector and non-performing 
loans, which would be affected by social factors (Gosh,2015). Based on a study conducted in 
China, Guan, Zheng, HU, Fang and Ren (2017) analyzed the relationship between non-
performing loans and the carbon intensity of loans according to China‟s environment protection 
strategy and sought the results that prove that green credit would add to the credit risk of banks 
and hence increase non-performing loans (Guan et al., 2017)    
In regards to availing credit and loan expansions, Khan (2011) has cited that financial inclusion 
can contribute negatively to financial stability. This can occur by attempting to expand the pool 
of borrowers that leads to the degradation of lending standards. It is worth to recall that this was 
a major contributor to the severity of the “subprime” crisis in the United States (Khan,2011). 
Khan also argues that banks could increase their reputational risk if they outsource various 
functions as credit assessment in order to reach smaller borrowers. Moreover, if micro finance 
institutions are not properly regulated, an increase in lending by that group can dilute the overall 
effectiveness of regulation in the economy and intensify financial systems' risks (Khan, 2011). 
Merhotra and Yetman (2015) argue that under the condition of high-paced and reckless credit 
expansion, higher financial inclusion leads to uncertainty for financial stability. This growth 
norm of unfettered parts of the country‟s financial system may further weaken the stability of 
regulated financial systems (Merhotra & Yetman, 2015). 
Sahay, Cihak, N'Diaye, Barajas, Mitram, Kyobe, Mooi and Youssefi (2015) observe a negative 
impact of financial inclusion on financial stability.  The authors argue that with the lack of 
proper supervision, when credit is expanded to all, an increase in the risk of financial stability 
will be witnessed (Sahay et al., 2015). Furthermore, financial safeguards deteriorate when access 
to credit increases. They degrade more rapidly in countries with poor banking supervision. In 
contrast, states with strong supervision could observe the benefits of financial stability from this 
higher access to credit (Sahay et al, 2015). 
Advocating for the concept of financial inclusion, Hanning and Jansen (2010) argue that low 
income groups are immune to economic cycles. Thus, including them in the financial sector will 
likely raise the stability of the deposit and loan basis. They invoke anecdotal evidence suggesting 
that financial institutions that serve customers on the lower end tend to endure macro-crisis and 
sustain the local economic activity (Hanning & Jansen, 2010).  
Khan (2011) suggests that deciding to diversify banks' assets as a result of increased lending to 
smaller firms can decrease the overall riskiness of a bank loan‟s portfolio. This means that the 
size of a single borrower will be reduced in the overall portfolio and reduce its volatility 
(Khan,2011).   
Furthermore. Khan (2011) advances three core approaches through which financial inclusion can 
have a positive impact on financial stability. The first approach is by increasing the amount of 
credit to SME‟s, banks can diversify their investment portfolio which in turn would reduce the 
overall riskiness of the banks. Secondly, financial inclusion means allowing the entry of more 
small savers to the financial system. By inducting this segment to the financial sector, the deposit 
volume and its stability would rise and diminish the reliance on non-core financing, which has a 
deteriorating impact in times of financial catastrophe. This reflects in a decline of procyclical 
uncertainty. The third approach, is that financial inclusion may well reflect to an improved 
monetary policy through which financial stability goal could be achieved (Khan, 2011).   
Han and Melecky (2013), use the data from 90 countries to examine the link between financial 
inclusion and financial stability. The authors have observed that financial inclusion measured by 
wider access and use of deposits, can build stronger banks' deposit base in the period of financial 
trauma. This will aid in the stability of a country‟s financial sector, especially middle income 
countries (Han & Melecky, 2013). Morgan and Pointes (2014), find that financial inclusion 
measured by proportion of credit provided to small and medium sized enterprises, enhances 
stability in the financial system (Morgan & Pointes, 2014). 
In an effort to define more determinants of non-performing loans, researchers shifted their focus 
on factors from a macroeconomic perspective. In other words, referring to the regional economic 
development and the established economic theories. Beck, Jakubik and Piloiu (2015), deploy a 
number of national samples to analyze the influence of macroeconomic factors on non-
performing loans, and found that real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, stock prices, 
exchange rates, and interest rates greatly decrease the scale of non-performing loans, while the 
negative effect of the stock is stronger in developed countries (Beck et al., 2015).  
II.c Non Performing Loans (NPLs) 
Bhattarai (2015) in his study on the determinants of NPLs in Nepalese commercial banks, has 
cited that the real effective exchange rate has a strong positive impact on the NPL's level and that 
growth in real GDP had a reverse relationship with NPLs (Bhattarai, 2015). However, banks' size 
and inflation are not crucial determinants of NPLs. According to another study conducted in 
Greece, lending rates, real GDP growth rate, unemployment rate and public debt were considered 
as the explanatory variables that have an impact on the NPLs' levels (Bhattarai, 2015). Other 
banks' variables have an impact on the alteration of NPLs performance metrics as illustrated by 
return on equity (ROE), banks efficiency demonstrated by the ratio of operating expenses and 
operating income, and loans' categories (Bhattarai, 2015). NPLs are found to be determined by 
the GDP growth rate, real interest rates and lenient credit terms. The latter can create a herd 
behavior and agency problems that may incent bank managers to allow excessive lending during 
boom periods. It is also being found that banks' lending policy could have a crucial influence on 
NPLs (Bhattarai, 2015). 
Kjosevski and Petkovski (2017) has reported that measuring credit quality can be conducted 
using several indicators such as NPLs or defaults rates. However, NPLs has been used as a 
measure of credit quality as it has more popularity in the relative literature (Kjosevski & 
Petkovski, 2017). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), NPLs is the best 
indicator for showing the quality of loan portfolio. The authors believe that a slowdown in 
economic activity is likely to increase the growth of NPLs. They have also cited that a rapid 
growth of credit can detriment loan performance, due to soft-loan constraints and 
macroeconomic overheating. Higher concentration in banking usually accords higher NPLs. 
In the context of procyclicality theory, a strong economic growth and decelerating NPLs ratio to 
picture loan quality portfolio could be interpreted as a sign of economic overheating, hence a 
potential threat to banking performance. The authors also allude to a study conducted on few 
Baltic states, which found that GDP growth has a significant determinant of NPLs. Furthermore, 
after the introduction of the real estate market growth rate as an explanatory variable, the former 
played an important role in Latvia and Lithuania. 
The authors reference a study where NPLs varies due to a negative correlation with GDP growth 
in the Baltic states and Romania. The inflation rate exhibited a negative correlation with NPLs in 
all countries except Lithuania. The lending interest rate has demonstrated a positive correlation 
with NPLs in all countries except Romania. Likewise, for unemployment that has positively 
correlated with the NPLs in all countries.  (Kjosevski & Petkovski, 2017) 
Kumarasinghe (2017) has mentioned the relationship of banks losses due to credit risk as an 
effect of the evolution of the business cycle. The outcome confirms that banks' loan loss 
provisions and new bad debt are affected by the evolution of the business cycle (Kumarasinghe, 
2017). In this respect, during economic boom, banks' loans increase rapidly and credit expansion 
decrease significantly in the depression cycle (Kumarasinghe, 2017). On the contrary, in times of 
depression, the banks are reluctant to extend credit for the end of investment, hence reducing the 
lending growth in the economy (Kumarasinghe, 2017). It is also found that when capital surplus 
over the regulatory minimum is low, banks are more inclined to reduce lending, negatively 
affecting the output of the economy  (Kumarasinghe, 2017). As previously demonstrated, NPLs 
lower level during boom is affected by high revenues of borrowers securing a stable cash flow to 
meet their loans obligations. The opposite side would be that the growth of NPLs in times of 
depression is caused by the fall in value of collaterals, hence incapable of covering the 
outstanding balance in case of default (Kumarasinghe, 2017).    
II.d Financial inclusion credit risk 
One of the goals of financial inclusion is to allow individuals and entities to acquire loans. 
However, with the propagation of loans as a mean of increasing the underserved segments influx 
into the official financial sector, the former is confronted with potential default levels, leading to 
the increase of Non-performing loans. This could be economically counter-productive, hence, 
compelling banks‟ management to control this risk. In this respect, this part is set to cover means 
in the past literature pertaining to decreasing the risk produced from loans acquisition under the 
umbrella of financial inclusion. 
II.d.1 Micro Finance and Banking Practices to Control Credit Risk 
Mckernan (2002), has cited the Grameen Bank model in lending to the underserved segment of 
the population. Microcredit programs approach poverty alleviation in a two-tiered approach, they 
deliver credit to the poor for the purchase of capital input with the end in mind to promote 
productive self-employment (McKernan, 2002). Moreover, they also provide non-credit services 
that are known as social development programs such as vocation trainings, civil responsibilities 
and rights, information in the area of health, and information sharing and monitoring among 
members. These non-credit services that distinguish group lending programs from banks or 
individual lending institutions, may be an element of success of micro-credit programs and thus a 
critical element to maintain when expanding and replicating programs (McKernan, 2002).   
Godquin (2004) perceives a join liability through peer selection, monitoring, and pressure to 
enhance repayment rates' performance (Godquin, 2004). Besides, social ties and group 
homogeneity are also expected to increase repayment performance through a greater efficiency 
because of group dynamics (Godquin, 2004). The author believes that group homogeneity 
resulting from effective peer selection as a mean to increase peer monitoring should positively 
influence higher repayment rates (Godquin, 2004). High ties should have the same influence 
because they ease peer monitoring and increase social sanction of peer pressure. The author also 
adds, that dynamic incentives and the employment of non-financial services, which are 
innovative microfinance not based on group lending, are also expected to increase repayment 
performance (Godquin, 2004).  Dynamic incentives are said to be used when microfinance 
institutions increase the amount of lending to certain borrowers as credit is renewed, and 
condition the allocation of new loans to previous repayment behavior. Some microfinance 
programs are known as credit plus, as they provide services such as health services or adult 
literacy. It may also include other trainings that go beyond financial services (Godquin, 2004). 
According to Ibtissem and Bouri (2013), moral hazard, adverse selection, small transaction sizes, 
amongst others, restrict the banking capacity to lend profitably to poor customers (Ibtissem & 
Bouri, 2013). The failure of commercial banking and the exclusion of poor borrowers, that 
originally one of the most important beneficiaries of the developmental purpose of financial 
inclusion, raise question on how poor people can improve their situation (Ibtissem & Bouri, 
2013). 
In this respect, the authors have reported in their publication several mechanisms that allow 
microfinance institutions to generate high repayment rates from borrowers without the need for 
collaterals and group lending contracts (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). The first mechanism is the 
threat of not to refinance a borrower who defaults on obligations. This will have a huge impact 
on the borrowers‟ behaviors as they consider future loans to develop their business. The credible 
threat to suspend future lending when loans are not satisfied, can be exploited to overcome 
information problems (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). 
Another mechanism used to reduce lending risks and defaults is to establish a collateral 
substitute that could act as an emergency fund (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). Following the Grameen 
Bank model, many microfinance institutions, at the initial phase of their operations, require 
borrowers to pay extra 0.5% of every unit borrowed. This emergency fund functions as an 
insurance against loan default, death, or disability (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). Ibtissem and Bouri 
have also cited Bank Rakyat Indonesia that uses the borrower‟s degree certificate, driver‟s 
license, marriage certificate among others as collateral substitute (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). 
While in Russia, household items may be perceived as collaterals if they have sufficient personal 
value for borrowers (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). Moreover, in Albania, lenders may accept 
tangible assets like stocks as collaterals substitutes (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). 
Among the other mechanisms that can sustain high repayment rates is the regular repayment 
schedule. Microfinance practioners believe that the discipline imposed by regular repayment 
maintains high repayment rates in the absence of collaterals (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). Moreover, 
it has been proven to have several advantages such as, screening out borrowers that are 
undisciplined at an early stage, and gives early warning for loan officers about future problems. 
It also allows the bank to control cash flows before consumption or diversion, and finally 
requires that the borrowers have a dependable additional income source as the repayment process 
begins before investment brings its fruit (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). 
Microfinance institutions are likely to conduct non-financial products that are known as Business 
Development Services (BDS) (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). The provision of non-financial services 
as a complementary to credit and saving services works on improving the economic viability of 
the borrower to satisfy the debt.  More importantly, it creates a valuable relationship between the 
former and the institutions. It has been found that the provision of non-financial services was 
positively correlated with repayment performance and may be the facet that guarantees the 
success of microcredit program (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). 
Nemoto, Yoshino, Okubo, Inaba and Yanagisawa (2018) view that the default prediction is likely 
to improve when a model based on bank account information is used . If the utilization of the 
bank account information has been mainstreamed, banks will be able to reduce credit costs, 
review times and costs, and make loans to SMEs with greater efficiency. The reason for the 
potential success of such model, is that the bank account information cannot be manipulated nor 
altered by an information provider for the purposes of tax returns or loan applications. Hence the 
bank receiving the account information can examine the data even if the target company is a new 
customer. Hence, eliminating concerns regarding the credibility of the information and the 
personnel costs to scrutinize it, which deeply impact financial scoring loans. Employment of the 
bank account information model, allows banks to calculate the upper lending limit. By having a 
hand on the annual cash flow of the borrowers' account, a bank can estimate the realistic amount 
a borrower can repay. Based on this estimation, a bank can have better determination on the 
loan's amount. (Nemoto et al., 2018).   
Bazarbash (2019) perceives that Emergent Market Economies (EMEs) are challenged by low 
financial inclusion and could really gain from financial technology (Fintech) lending. This end 
could be realized by applying machine learning (ML) based credit rating that can bring about 
substantial consequences in the credit market in these economies. By improving credit analysis, 
Fintech lending can reduce the time of credit decision and generate lower loan rates to existing 
borrowers. Among the main financial constraints in EMEs that confines the growth pace of the 
financial sector, are the lengthy credit decisions and high loan rates. Banks and Fintech lenders 
benefit by appropriately pricing the risk. Hence, lowering the debt servicing cost for borrowers 
while enhancing their asset quality (Bazarbash, 2019). 
Fintech can further assist in mainstreaming financial inclusion by lending to the underserved 
population relying on enhancing credit rating given that credit bureaus are either non-existent or 
poorly developed in EMEs. The asset quality of these borrowers will be lower than conventional 
borrowers. The fact that compel lenders to take more risk and should therefore offset the risk by 
holding sufficient buffer reserves and capital. Machine learning evaluation of credit risk should 
allow for measuring the amount of buffer (Bazarbash, 2019).       
II.d.2 Institutional Answers to Control Credit Risk  
Turner and Varghese (2010) paper on consumer credit information sharing, presents valuable 
means to control credit risk which is very applicable on financial inclusion case of extending 
loans for underserved segments of the community. The authors outline that the problem of 
asymmetric information in lending arises from the fact that a creditor knowledge of the 
borrower's potential to repay, that is, the risk profile, is vague and must be inferred based on 
available information. Hence one common result of information asymmetry is the misallocation 
of credit, as risk profiles are incorrectly assessed, where high risk borrowers confused for low 
risk ones and vice versa (Turner & Varghese, 2010). 
Turner and Varghese has cited the work of Stiglitz and Weiss on the implications of information 
asymmetry that pointed out that in competitive equilibrium, credit market can witness rationing 
owing to insufficient information. Information asymmetry leads banks to rely on a combination 
of pricing (interest rates) and rationing to increase returns. However, high interest rates while 
covering the risk of borrower default result in adverse selection. That is higher interest rates 
attract borrowers seeking to make risky investments with potential for high rates of return 
(Turner & Varghese, 2010). 
Stiglitz and Weiss view that the price mechanism on its own may not clear the loan markets due 
to the fact that, with interest rate increase to cover for high risk profiles, riskier applicants tend to 
be attracted. Furthermore, some borrowers are enticed to make riskier investments to cover for 
the price of credit. In addition, borrowers will be lured not to pay as in the absence of 
information sharing, they can still acquire loans from other lenders. Facing this moral hazard, 
which is the relative lack of penalty for non-payment, moreover the problem of adverse selection 
that stem from information asymmetry, lenders will have to ration credits. Credit rationing 
occurs when two individuals with identical risk preferences and profiles, one will receive a loan 
while the other would not (Turner & Varghese, 2010). 
According to Turner and Varghese, credit bureaus are the institutional answer to the problems of 
information asymmetry and moral hazard in credit markets. Information sharing open a pathway 
to a lender to better assess the risk profile of a potential borrower and introduce incentives to 
have a borrower pay on time in the form of narrowing the former's future ability to access credit 
from other suppliers. In presenting information about potential borrower to a lender, Credit 
Reporting Agencies (CRA) play a crucial role in reducing informational asymmetry and moral 
hazard by allowing interest rates that are fine-tuned, or that reflect the risk of the individual 
borrower. This leads to adjust to lower interest rates for lower risk borrowers. CRA's also allow 
for a lower average interest rate, greater lending through reduced rationing, and lower rates of 
delinquency and default (Turner & Varghese, 2010). 
Credit reporting regime has an impact on lending availability. The research suggests that full-file 
comprehensive credit reporting widens credit opportunities to the private sector than other credit 
reporting regimes such as negative-only reporting. Full-file comprehensive reporting results in 
better loan performance than segmented and negative-only reporting regime. Comprehensive 
credit reporting works on including non-financial data, the fact that increases access and improve 
performance compared to a system in which information sharing is restricted to the financial 
sector (Turner & Varghese, 2010).         
According to the Global Partnership on Financial Inclusion (GPFI), the improvement of the 
infrastructure for SME finance should be tackled through enhancing the credit report system and 
enabling a better access to financial information by Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 
(MSME). The GPFI has reported that in 1997 the Peruvian Superintendency of Banking has 
conducted a series of overhauling that render the credit bureaus more effective in reducing the 
risk and costs of lending, especially to MSMEs. The two most important changes were the 
introduction of all loans, not just large loans, in the required information and the extension of 
coverage to a range of nonbank entities (municipal banks, rural banks, and micro and SME 
development lenders. The other improvement entailed the disclosure of this information to 
private credit bureaus and the inclusion of a wider range of debt. Moreover, overhauling of the 
credit report system has taken into consideration the inclusion of positive as well as negative 
information (GPFI, 2014). For MSMEs, this means lower costs and better risk management. As 
per the GPFI, these changes have instigated higher competition and has decreased interest rates 
(GPFI, 2014).  
The Euro Mediterranean Network of Economic Studies (EMNES) (2018) on financial 
development and inclusion in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia has cited Credit Guarantee 
Company‟s (CGC) as a tool to enhance access to finance, which is the main pillar to economic 
development achieved by supporting MSMEs seeking funding. CGCs provide guarantees to 
MSMEs without collaterals, or with inadequate collateral and track records to seek financing 
opportunity without the necessity of a guarantee. Moreover, CGC works on covering percentage 
of the risk pertaining to enterprises besides its provision of guarantee to the MSMEs (Euro-
Mediterranean Network of Economic Studies, 2018).  
CGC is likely to play a crucial role to remedy the status distinguishing the economies in 
transition from other economies, is that the financing gap can be extremely pronounced for 
factors such as, the lack of usable collaterals. This is in addition to the narrow range of assets that 
can be collateralized compared to more developed economies. In emerging economies, banks act 
as the only viable source of external financing. This is because in emergent economies, most of 
capital providers are capital importers, with a significant part of foreign capital inflows is 
arriving from the foreign direct investment or intercompany loans. These types of funds are 
likely not to be available for SMEs. In addition to this, the information gap between SMEs and 
the non-resident capital providers is huge, this as the capital owner lacks knowledge of the local 
situation that is indispensable for funding small companies (Euro-Mediterranean Network of 
Economic Studies, 2018). 
CGCs are likely to be important in times of economic and cyclical setbacks. In times of 
increasing volatility, the financing gap for SMEs are likely to widen. The reasons for credit 
decline in times of financial stress, is the degraded capital of banks and liquidity positions that 
decreases the supply of credit in general across the economy. The high uncertainty that positively 
impact moral hazard and adverse selection that come as a natural element in SMEs lending. The 
matter that encourages banks to limit credit provision to SMEs. Other reasons may include the 
declining value of collateralized lending as the values of several collateral decrease in time of 
financial distress. Moreover, other sources of external financing such as trade credit dwindles 
just the same. In this respect, the demand for credit is likely to decline as well in time of 
economic downturns. In practice, it is observed that authorities in various countries responded to 
post-crisis slowdowns by offering large-scale guarantee programs for SMEs (Euro-
Mediterranean Network of Economic Studies, 2018).       
However, the European Investment Fund has identified key constraints for the use of credit 
guarantee. The most important constraint is the lack of credit demand by SME's. This in turn will 
impact on the demand for CGC, as the former's credit activity is conditional on the demand for 
loan. This is likely to occur for purely economic aspects such as SME's business plans or 
profitability measures, or other hurdles such as the lack of collateral or high borrowing costs. 
Another issue hampering CGC's from realizing their goals, is the eligibility problem. Guarantee 
products are accessible only to a narrow range of clients and the product parameters exclude 
potential clients that do not fit into the specific criteria. The administrative procedures related to 
credit guarantee is a key factor that hinders the use of credit guarantee. The cost assigned to 
guarantee products are among the most crucial impediments that discourage SME's to use this 
benefit for their own sake. This is likely to heavily persist especially when the banks have done 
their part of the deal to facilitate access to credit by lowering interest rates (EBCI-Vienna 
Initiative, 2014).       
II.d.3 Monetary Policy Answers to Control Credit Risk 
Shedding light on the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation, some 
contributions perceive that bank capital may hamper liquidity creation by making the bank's 
capital structure less fragile. A bank occupying this status is likely to be committed to monitor its 
borrowers, allowing it to extend loans. Additional equity capital hinders the less fragile bank to 
commit to monitoring, which in turns impede the bank's ability to create liquidity (Berger & 
Bouwman, 2009). Furthermore, capital may reduce liquidity creation because it crowds out 
deposits. According to Berger and Bouwman (2009) this is known as financial fragility- 
crowding out hypothesis (Berger & Bouwman, 2009). 
In this respect, a counter argument pertaining to banks as risk transformers is being provided. 
Higher capital improves banks' ability to absorb risk, herein their ability to create liquidity. The 
creation of liquidity makes banks more prone to risks. The greater the liquidity being created, the 
higher the likelihood and severity of losses associated with having to get rid of illiquid assets to 
satisfy customers' demand for liquidity. Capital absorb risks and expands the banks' risk-bearing 
capacity, thus, higher capital ratios allow banks to create more liquidity. These set of theories are 
referred to as risk absorption hypothesis. In this light, these predictions are only the product of 
these theories combined rather that separated (Berger & Bouwman, 2009) 
According to the World Bank report on enabling an environment for financial inclusion in the 
MENA region, deficiencies are found in the financial infrastructures and regulations that enforce 
it. This makes the increasing access to finance much costly and risky for banks. Lenders have to 
depend on collaterals that require hefty costs to register and credit assessments and risk 
management techniques that became obsolete. As per the report, the slight improvement of credit 
information quality and availability, moreover, the increasing efficiency of credit registries and 
the establishment of credit bureaus is not being accessed by microfinance institutions nor 
reported to them (Pearce, 2011).  
The report which was published back in 2011, has reported that interest rate flexibility is being 
constrained. More than 6 MENA countries have placed caps on interest rates. Furthermore, most 
countries in the MENA region use disclosure requirements rather than usury ceilings in practice 
with the end in mind to guaranty the transparency of interest rates. However, it would have been 
much of a transparent approach to remove interest rate caps and instead strengthen consumer 
protection against exploitative practices such as excessive fees on overdraft and lack of 
consumer redress and miss-selling of financial products (Pearce, 2011). 
For financial inclusion to thrive, financial infrastructure requires an overhauling. Moral hazard 
and adverse selection decrease when the collateral framework and the credit information system 
are ameliorated. Loans can be offered at a lowered cost and risk to clients that would have been 
previously excluded. Financial inclusion booming is conditioned by the enforcement of 
transaction laws, unified collateral registries to ease the process for lenders to use the former as 
guarantees. Only by then, micro entrepreneur will be hindered to leverage current assets into 
access to finance (Pearce, 2011).   
Ghenemi, Chaibi, and Omri (2017) in their study about the effect of liquidity and credit risk on 
bank stability covering the MENA region, have cited the work of Dermine (1986) that liquidity 
risk is seen as a profit lowering cost. A loan default would work on increasing liquidity risk due 
to the lowered cash inflows and the depreciation it causes. According to the theory of financial 
intermediation and the industrial organization approach to banking, there is a relationship 
between liquidity and credit risk. Moreover, risky banks assets generate bank shocks. Hence, we 
can reach the conclusion that liquidity and credit risk are positively related and together they 
contribute to banking instability (Ghenemi et al. 2017). 
According to the authors, in the case of increasing number of economic projects that are funded 
with loans, the bank will face difficulties to meet the demand of depositors. Herein, these 
depositors will claim back their money if the value of assets have deteriorated. This means that 
credit and liquidity risk increase back to back (Ghenemi et al. 2017). 
Banks' default risk is primarily driven by low capitalization and earnings, over exposure to 
certain categories of loans and extreme loan defaults. Moreover, banks should be regulated on 
the assets side instead of that of the capital. Banks should hold more liquid assets that would 
allow them to face liquidity risk and manage and monitor risks to which they are exposed 
(Ghenemi et al. 2017). 
Awad and Eid (2018) clarifies in their study in an effort to analyze the weight of economic 
benefit of financial access against the effect on risk profile of bank and non-bank lending. The 
redistribution of credit towards new borrowers' segments comes with a cost at the account of 
financial intermediation efficiency illustrated in higher screening and information costs. In 
addition to changes in the risk profiles of bank lending as they issue loans to novel borrowers 
that are perceived as riskier clients. In other words, if the expansion of credit is not well 
managed, and if combined with low capitalization, can lead to financial crises (Awad & Eid, 
2018).    
According to the authors, financial inclusion can improve firms' access to credit and assist 
financial institutions in diversifying their loan portfolios. In this respect, extending loans to firms 
that were previously excluded may decrease the average credit risk of loan portfolios. However, 
increasing financial inclusion is not a safety valve for financial stability. If financial inclusion is 
coupled with a huge appetite for credit growth, financial risk may rise. Financial inclusion can be 
disseminated by involving the poor who were previously underserved, by availing credit for him 
or her. Nevertheless, paying no attention to their ability to repay the loan can compromise on the 
humane purpose of financial inclusion. As a result, this can degrade the lending standards. 
Moreover, financially excluded households by nature, lack historical records which are prevalent 
where personal identification systems are weak. Besides, there are bounds to speed limits to 
banks' ability to absorb a new customer without seeing deterioration in credit quality, owing to 
limits in screening capacity. The authors also added that an increase in financial inclusion, leads 
to fast paced structural change that compels central banks to retain sufficient capacity to monitor 
and react to any system-wide risks that could develop (Awad & Eid, 2018). 
Awad and Eid (2018) has cited the work of Čihák, Mare, & Melecky on studying the nexus 
between financial inclusion and stability as two policy objectives and estimating the association 
between both. The results have concluded that on average, financial inclusion and financial 
stability are negatively correlated and hence linked more through trade-offs than synergies. 
According to the cited authors, the inclusion-stability nexus is most influenced by financial 
openness, fiscal freedom, education, and the depth of the credit information system. While 
financial openness stimulates trade-offs between inclusion and stability, fiscal freedom, 
education and credit information depth generate synergies between the targeted variables. Hence, 
if financial policy aims to push for individual financial inclusion, complementary policies to 
deepen credit information system could help mitigate the estimated trade-offs with financial 
stability (Awad & Eid, 2018). 
Another vital point, is that people using financial services should be capable financially. This is 
perceived to be a major challenge in country having low GDP levels and higher level of poverty. 
Herein, governments shall not advance the virtues of financial inclusion services to high poverty 
segments of the community without basic level of education that aid in instigating the 
beneficiaries' awareness about different financial institutions furnishing different financial 
services (Awad & Eid, 2018). 
According to Castellanos, Henrnandez, Mahajan, and Sierra (2019), based on an experiment 
conducted to answer whether banks can use contract terms to moderate borrower risks. In other 
words, whether altering contract terms can stimulate change in borrowers' behavior. While the 
experiment has been developed in the realm of the Mexico‟s banking industry, the study has 
found that providing credit cards to “new to banks” borrowers, results in substantial risk, with 
44% of the experiment‟s control group has exited the bank over the 27 months of the experiment. 
A proxy for net banks revenues has been constructed and found that the average net present 
value of the 27 month experience net revenue per account is 623 pesos while the standard 
deviation is 2580 pesos. Using a wide range of observables, we can explain that less than 5% of 
the variation in card default, exit, and profits. Together these two facts signify that lending to 
new to bank borrowers is risky and that it is hard to predict at the time the card is issued 
(Castellanos et al. 2019). 
To answer whether banks can use contract terms to mitigate the risk, the study has proven that 
large changes in annual interest rates have limited effect on card debt and default for new to 
banks borrowers. The correlation between default and the interest rate (or loan size) is 
interpreted as a measure of moral hazard. As for minimum payment alteration, it has similar 
effect to those of the interest rate changes (Castellanos et al. 2019). 
The same study has resolved to the fact that, while 28% of new to banks borrowers do not 
default on their first year, they get a second credit card issued by a different bank in the same 
year compared to only 2% of clients defaulting on their first year. This process is known as 
“poaching” of clients, may disincentive banks to lend customers with no credit history. In this 
light, poaching can hinder financial inclusion, seeing that banks are aware that new to banks 
borrowers who establish favorable credit history have tendency to be poached by other banks 
(Castellanos et al. 2019).      
According to Castellanos, Henrnandez, Mahajan, and Sierra (2019), based on experimental 
results to reduce default levels by altering two key elements of the credit card contract, namely, 
interest rates and minimum payments. The authors have concluded that by lowering the interest 
rates from 45% to 15%, the default levels have decreased by 2.6 percentage points on a based 
rate of 19% over a period of 26 months. The study also found a positive correlation between 
default and interest rates which is interpreted as a measure of moral hazard (Castellanos et al. 
2019). 
While some policymakers are concerned that lowering minimum payment could result in 
excessive borrowing hence increasing defaulting potential. This could have a drastic impact for 
both borrowers and the financial institutions. In this respect, policy makers have advocated to 
raise minimum payments. According to Castellanos and others (2019), increasing the minimum 
payments can have two opposing effects that are not clear which one shall have dominance. On 
one hand, it could reduce debt facilitating the repayment burden, thereby decreasing the default 
level. On the other hand, it could tighten short run liquidity constraints, which increases the 
default level (Castellanos et al. 2019). 
In an effort to extricate the dual effect of raising the minimum payment, the study has resulted to 
having the second effect (tightening liquidity constraints) was no longer operational as all 
subjects were returned to common minimum payment of 4%, 3 years after the termination of the 
experiment. However, debt is lower at the end of the experiment in the higher minimum payment 
arms, thus, the repayment burden is respectively lowered. Moreover, during the experiment, both 
effects of raising the minimum payment cancelled each other out, emphasizing the double-edged 
nature of increasing minimum payment as policy tool to limit default (Castellanos et al. 2019). 
In an attempt to investigate the relationship between financial inclusion and circumstances 
monetary policy and economic fundamentals. Yin, Xu, Chen, and Peng's (2019) empirical results 
show that monetary policy has a short term positive impact on financial inclusion factors 
meanwhile economic fundamentals has the opposite. In other words, positive monetary policy 
promotes the development of financial inclusion in the short term and sudden change of the 
economic situation will make it harder (Yin et al., 2019).  
Shihadeh, Gamage and Hannoon (2019) have resolved that enhancing credit to SMEs would 
decrease the value of the non-performing loans in banks operating in Palestine. The study has 
also covered SMEs applying to the European Palestinian Credit Guarantee Fund (EPCGF) that 
encourages banks to extend more credit to SME's at a minimum level of risk. In addition, to 
allowing more source of financing to SMEs, banks can become more involved in other activities 
related to SME's by providing training and financial management, and investing in technologies. 
In this light, convincing banks to invest in SME through providing credit could have a positive 
outcome on the former's performance (Shihadeh et al., 2019).  
Lopez and Winkler (2019) have approached financial inclusion and credit risk away from the 
usual angle of having more inclusive banking sectors experiencing less crisis. However, given a 
crisis, a higher level of financial inclusion or a stronger development in financial inclusion in the 
times preceding the crisis, produces a benefit in the form of a less pronounced drop in credit 
growth, controlling for the size of the pre-crisis credit boom. Moreover, the authors test whether 
financial inclusion is a subject of boom-bust pattern. Meaning, whether a stronger borrower 
growth in pre-crisis period is linked to a steeper fall in borrower growth in a crisis. The results 
have supported that more inclusive banking sectors are likely to record decreases in credit and 
borrower growth in times of crisis. The study has also found that higher borrower growth rates in 
times preceding the crisis are not related to the depth of the credit bust following a crisis. This is 
to conclude, that countries are likely to gain from increasing levels of financial inclusion by 
recording less pronounced bust in credit and borrower growth. This is to concur that higher 
levels of financial inclusion make financial systems more resilient in times of crises. 
Nonetheless, the rapid development of financial inclusion has no mitigating effect on credit 
developments in a crisis, given pre-crisis credit development (Lopez & Adalbert, 2019).  
II.e Improving Economic Stability by Increasing Access to Financial 
Institutions 
Financial inclusion shall not exclude customers lacking track records to be allowed to acquire 
loans and employ this debt for a better quality of life. However, financial inclusion has been 
gaining much more significance and popularity by international organizations and leading 
developmental financial institutions for allowing people into the formal economy by depositing 
and saving money in banks. This humane product should be sponsored by governments by 
furnishing policies capable of lessening the conventional hurdles that hamper the citizens' ability 
to open bank accounts. Moreover, the governments should work on enhancing citizens' trust into 
the official economy represented by the banks and other financial institutions. This increased 
access into banks that is going to act in its turn to secure regular cash flow will have a positive 
impact on the economy as a whole. Besides, it will serve the usual setback committed by 
financial inclusion illustrated in the increasing lending risk. In other words, the increasing cash 
flows as a product of savings and deposits account could assist the banks in providing for the 
risks caused by financial risks. This is to say, that increasing bank access leads to higher liquidity 
which could enhance the banks reserves to cover lending risks or NPLs.    
Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan (2005) have cited the explanation of banks' structure by arguing 
that pooling funds in intermediary agents can guarantee against liquidity shocks while still 
investing most of their funds in high return but illiquid projects. This structure advances the 
potential of self-sustaining banks and a policy for deposit insurance. The authors have also 
reached the conclusion that banks' risks measured by stock volatility increase unused loan 
commitments and reflect liquidity risk exposure. This increase is alleviated by transaction 
deposits. Moreover, the risk does not increase with loan commitments for banks with transaction 
deposits. (Gatev et al., 2005).     
The authors have also extended these results by testing how the deposit-lending diversification 
synergy varies across market conditions. Banks having high level transaction deposits have 
decreased risks with the level of unused commitments when the spread of commercial paper-
treasury bills are high. The deposit-lending hedge is prevailing in times when the short term 
credit market become expensive because banks face increased take-down demands by borrowers 
shocked by tight market conditions at the same time that they are experience funding inflows 
into their transaction deposits. The inflows and outflows offset in turn strengthen the risk 
management synergy. Furthermore, transaction deposit plays an important role in allowing banks 
to manage their liquidity risk (Gatev et al., 2005).        
Basu (2005) on a study pertaining to the development of a financial system to India's poor, 
building an inclusive banking system will require more radical overhauling in order to ameliorate 
incentive regime, promote competition and enhance the efficiency of rural financial institutions 
and markets. One of the suggested measures is allowing the most competitive lender to enter in 
rural areas and decrease distortion by having the government make a priority sector lending 
obligations tradable. The highest competing lender will be paid by the less well placed banks to 
effectively take their priority lending requirements for a price. Creating a market for priority 
lending requirements would benefit the rural poor and the banks. They will be able to access 
finance via the most competitive institutions (Basu, 2005). 
Another suggested measure is for the government to revisit its policy on interest rates caps 
pertaining to rural lending rates and floors on deposit rates. Poor borrowers are deprived of 
accessing finance and end up paying high interest rates to informal lenders. In addition to that, 
the entry of new private banks in rural finance could be a good indication for other rural banks to 
reduce transaction costs and making rural banking profitable. This move shall be sponsored by 
the governments that should create an environment that would make it possible and lucrative for 
interested private banks to emerge in the rural financial market. Moreover, much is needed to 
increase competition in rural banking by liberating interest rates, hence, lending to small and 
rural clients can become more profitable business for banks. Having mentioned the emergence of 
banks in rural areas, governments will have to amend their policies on branch licensing, as 
private banks may be interested in buying up the branch networks of the government-owned 
rural banks (Basu, 2005). 
The author perceives that weaknesses in regulatory standards, slacking enforcement, and 
regulatory forbearance have invested deeply in the financial distress that characterizes many 
regional rural banks and cooperatives and have undermined market discipline. Prudential 
regulation standards such as capital adequacy, income recognition, asset classification, and 
provisioning for regional rural banks and cooperatives need to cope with standards governing 
commercial banks, and supervisory enforcement needs to be strengthened (Basu, 2005).            
Beck, Kunt, Peria (2007) view that broad financial services outreach is vital for several reasons. 
That are a well-developed financial system for economic development and poverty alleviation. 
Financial market imperfections such as transaction costs, information asymmetries, contract 
enforcement costs are likely to have their toll on poor households and or small entrepreneurs 
who lack collateral, credit history, and connections. The lack of access to financial services in 
general places impedes poor households and small entrepreneurs to realize high return 
investments, it also reduces the efficiency of resources allocations and impact growth negatively 
and poverty alleviation (Beck et al., 2007).   
Honohan (2008) has reported that products' features such as high minimum cover for an 
insurance product, or hefty penalties for unauthorized overdraft which tends to be inevitable to 
avoid for poor people using checking accounts. In addition to have a fixed address as a pre-
requisite to open an account, are all illustrations of obstacles standing in the way between the 
end-user and these products. In some other cases, customers may be screened out because of risk 
characteristics. Other obstacles hampering the utility of these services is the rationalization of 
branches and service points may lead to in many poor customers compelled to travel far 
distances to make an account worthwhile. For the reason that full participation in economic life 
in advanced economies rely on having an account in a financial intermediary, and given the extra 
costs often on non-account holders, several countries have adopted policies in recent years to 
reduce financial exclusion (Honohan, 2008). 
Honohan perceives exclusion in low and middle income countries to be normal for the bulk of 
the population. Thus it is normal to entertain broadening the access to financial services rather 
than the elimination of exclusion as the immediate goal. With that being said, it is rational that 
microfinance emerges heavily in this breading environment for financial development. 
Microfinance pioneers have shed light on the very high rates of returns that can be earned by the 
poor and the near-poor in urban and peri-urban settings. This furnishes a high demand for 
borrowings even at high interest rates. Some microfinance institutions work on credit–only basis, 
funding themselves from charitable donors, while some others employ forced savings elements 
to the loan framework. In general, the trend is to emphasize deposits the same way as loans as a 
vital tool for efficient financial management, no matter they represent precautionary savings, or 
means of accumulating capital. It is also crucial to mention that transaction accounts are also 
important for receiving and making remittances on a local and international levels among family 
members (Honohan, 2008).  
Mookerjee and Kalipioni (2010) have concluded in their studies that there is a robust support for 
the general idea that micro focused measures of financial development have a positive impact on 
the poor and income distribution. The study has resolved to the fact that better access to bank 
branches, which is translated into availing banking services to the underserved segments of the 
community have positive impact on the poor. However, the study has detected that higher 
barriers to banking services measured by imposing higher minimums to open checking/savings 
account has negative impact on income distribution (Mookerjee & Kalipioni, 2010).        
Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) has concluded that the physical and human capital investments by 
the poor are subject to liquidity constraints. Moreover, improvement in the financial 
intermediation positively affects the poor because it creates opportunities for the former to 
possess liquid assets and earn higher return on their savings. In times of economic booming, they 
may start from benefiting from greater availability of credit. However, bank crises are likely to 
harm the poor who have very few opportunities to diversity their assets (Jeanneney & Kdobar, 
2011).  
Celerier and Matray (2016) on a study about bank branch supply and the unbanked phenomenon, 
perceives that being unbanked is driven by supply and or demand side factors. The demand side 
revolves around cultural determinants, that is, distrust in financial institutions or may not have 
culture of saving. Financial literary also remains a major persistent element of a deeply rooted 
communal culture. On the other hand, the supply side suggests that standard bank practices 
create obstacles for the poor. Minimum account balance, overdraft fees, a large distance between 
branches, results in increasing costs that may be to burdening for poor households to manage. 
Moreover, banking services may not be customized to match the demands of low-income 
households. These hurdles can have different policy implications. The demand side predicts 
intervention at the household level through financial literacy programs, while the supply side 
concerning banking regulations should be solved by giving banking incentives to amend their 
behavior, which lead to reducing the share of unbanked households (Celerier & Matray, 2016). 
Kodongo (2018) has analyzed the relationship between capital adequacy and liquidity and credit 
to high risky small scale agriculture. The analysis has resided to the fact that, choking prudential 
regulations could hamper the provision of credit to small businesses and therefore conflict with 
the country's financial inclusion objectives. The capital adequacy requirement narrows banks' 
ability to avail credit to small business clients and may result in credit rationing. However, the 
author sees that the effect of capital regulations on credit provision could be controlled with few 
macroeconomic enablers. These enablers could be in the form of measures implemented to 
achieve stability in the financial sector and in the macroeconomic environment (Kodongo, 2018).  
This emerges with the end in mind to reduces the level of financial exclusion which in its turn 
threatens financial integrity. In other words, seeing financially excluded individuals resort to 
informal financial services, this is likely to compromise on the effectiveness of anti-money 
laundering and counter-financing terrorism measures which are two of the main priorities on the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)'s agenda. In this respect, there are concerns that the 
establishment of some financial integrity jurisdictions such as, raising costs of compliance, 
imposing regulatory obstacles against new service providers and creating eligibility barriers 
could cease the realization of financial inclusion. Henceforth, to reduce the tension lying in the 
nexus of financial integrity and financial inclusion, the FATF recommends that low-income 
countries to have exemptions such as relaxing identification requirements in specific well 
instances, which is the case in countries like India (Kodongo, 2018). 
Anarfo, Abor, and Osei (2019) views that despite the role performed by financial regulation to 
block distortion to competition, sustaining integrity of the market, and reducing information 
asymmetry, they may also have unwanted implications by hampering the efficient intermediation 
process of financial institutions and inhibit their ability to provide financial services. For 
example, capital adequacy regulation may force some banks that are not financially competent to 
cease business or merge with other banks and this may cause barriers to emerge into the banking 
sector. Naturally, this will decrease competition and the availability of funds to commercial 
banks for lending, which will eventually harm the realization of financial inclusion. 
Nevertheless, low credit volumes dictated by iron fist financial regulations, may encourage 
lenders to seek profits by lending to only successful credit applications at high interest rates. 
Furthermore, this will curb levels of access to credit, hence, leading to low financial inclusion 
(Anarfo et al., 2019). 
We can observe that Anarfo et. al have a sort of agreement with the views of Kondogo. 
However, the former have introduced financial stability measured by the bank Z-score to 
moderate the relationship between financial regulation and financial inclusion. In this respect, the 
study has concluded that the interaction of financial stability and financial regulation has a 
positive effect on financial inclusion in the study's population, that is, Sub-Saharan African 
economies. This suggests that financial stability negates the negative consequences of financial 
regulation on financial inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa. This means that financial regulation has 
no impact on financial inclusion when financial institutions is financially stable. Putting this fact 
in mind, policy and regulatory bodies should focus on nurturing financial stability as a tool for 
the propagation of financial service usage as well as for better financial decision making at the 
micro and macro levels (Anarfo et .,2019).      
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter Three 
Statistical Tests, Estimations Methods and Results 
Part One 
III.1.a Introduction 
In this Part the variables upon which the study is conducted are defined. Furthermore, the 
sources from which the variables are extracted are highlighted. In addition, the part will be 
devoted to achieve and discuss measures of rounded descriptive analysis such as Normality test; 
Linearity test and the Heteroskedasticity test. 
This section reports the results of regressing the common indicators of financial inclusion on an 
indicators of banks‟ credit risk. The results are reported in tables (3-5), where table (1) list the 
factors examined in the thesis and table (2) summarizes the factors used in the thesis. With the 
end in mind to conduct the all the following estimations, the researcher has used Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). 
III.1.b Data 
The data about financial inclusion is obtained mainly from the Global Findex compiled by the 
World Bank (https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/ ). This index includes data about financial 
inclusion in three-year intervals 2011, 2014, 2017. 
The data about banks‟ credit risk is obtained from Fitch IBCA‟s Bankscope database.  
The data include banks located in the MENA region. The countries included in the study are 
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, KSA, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen. 
III.1.c The Study variables 
The variables examined in this thesis are as follows.  
1. The Dependent variable (Y): The ratio of Provision for Loan Losses to Net Loans. This 
ratio is taken as a proxy for credit risk. 
2. The Independent variable (X): these include indicators of financial inclusion that have 
been examined in the literature. These indicators are as follows.   
X1: Saved at a financial institution (≥age15) 
X2: Debit card ownership (≥age15) 
X3: Borrowed from a financial institution (≥age15) 
X4: Borrowed from a financial institution or used a credit card in labor force 
(≥age15) 
X5: Borrowed from a financial institution or used a credit card out of labor force 
(≥age15) 
In addition to the above-mentioned main variables, the Country effects and longevity effects are 
examined through additional dummy variables in order to offer complete understanding to the 
factors that may have effect on financial inclusion. 
Table (1): List of the factors examined in the thesis 
 
Variable Measure References 
Saved at a financial institution 
(≥age15) 
 
The percentage of Respondents 
who report saving or setting aside 
any money at a bank or another 
type of financial institution in the 
past 12 months. 
Global Findex database 
 
Debit card ownership (≥age15) 
 
The percentage of respondents 
who report having a debit card 
Global Findex database 
 
Borrowed from a financial 
institution (≥age15) 
The percentage of respondents 
who report borrowing any money 
from a bank or another type of 
financial institution in the past 12 
months 
Global Findex database 
 
Borrowed from a financial 
institution or used a credit card in 
labor force (≥age15) 
The percentage of respondents 
who report borrowing any money 
from a bank or another type of 
financial institution, or using a 
credit card, in the past 12 months, 
in labor force 
Global Findex database 
 
Borrowed from a financial 
institution or used a credit card out 
of labor force (≥age15) 
 
The percentage of respondents 
who report borrowing any money 
from a bank or another type of 
financial institution, or using a 
credit card, in the past 12 months, 
out of labor force 
Global Findex database 
 
Ratio of Provision for Loan Losses Credit risk Fitch IBCA‟s Bankscope database 
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  Saved at a financial institution  
(≥age15)  
Debit card ownership  (≥age15) 
Borrowed from a financial 
institution  (≥age15) 
Borrowed from a financial 
institution or used a credit card 
in labor force  (≥age15) 
Borrowed from a financial 
institution or used a credit card 
out of labor force  (≥age15)  
to Net Loans 
 
The Study Model 
                                                                                                                    Dependent Variable 
  
 
                                           
                                                            
                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                   
                 
                      Independent Variables  
                                                                        Dummy variables 
Table (2) summarizes the factors examined in this thesis.   
Source: The author 
III.1.c The Study Methodology and Measures 
In order to acquire rounded descriptive analysis and sound results, which in turn, lead to 
achieving the main objective of the conducted study, thus, three technicalities and tests used 
respectively presented as follow; Normality test; Linearity test and the Heteroskedasticity test. 
First, the study uses the Normality test to determine if a data set is well-modeled by a normal 
distribution. The tests also compute how likely it is for a random variable underlying the data set 
to be normally distributed. Many statistical methods require that the data come from a normal 
distribution or at least can be reasonably approximated by a normal distribution. Relatively, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test is used where the latter test is said to be the 
Ratio of Provision 
for Loan Losses to 
Net Loans taken 
as a proxy for 
credit risk. 
 
Country 
effect  
Longevity 
preferred test of normality because of its good power properties as compared to a wide range of 
alternative tests (Shapiro, Wilk, & Chen, 1968). 
Normality Test 
Regarding the issue of normality, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test is used for testing 
the closeness of the variables‟ distribution to the assumptions of the normal distribution.
1
 The 
test is run under the hypothesis that: 
H0: The data are drawn from normal distribution. 
Ha: The data are drawn from non-normal distribution 
The results of normality show that all variables are not normally distributed. Table (3) reports the 
results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test. 
Table (3): The Results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test for Normality 
  
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-
Wilk     
  Statistic Df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Provision for 
loan losses to Net 
Loans 
0.08672 524 4.35734E-10 0.87806 524 7.2454E-20 
Saved at a 
financial 
institution  
(≥age15) 
0.14463 524 1.25883E-29 0.90828 524 3.0677E-17 
Debit card 
ownership  
(≥age15) 
0.21012 524 1.51609E-64 0.8876 524 4.2808E-19 
Borrowed from a 
financial 
institution  
(≥age15) 
0.15997 524 1.38563E-36 0.86716 524 1.0733E-20 
                                                          
 
 
Borrowed from a 
financial 
institution or 
used a credit card 
in labor force  
(≥age15) 
0.17537 524 2.53375E-44 0.86138 
524 4.0837E-21 
Borrowed from a 
financial 
institution or 
used a creditcard 
out of labor force 
(≥age15) 0.24227 524 1.14524E-86 0.72428 524 1.6376E-28 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Therefore, an approximation to normality is necessary to satisfy the multivariate analysis main 
assumptions. In other words, the variables are converted to normality in order to confirm that the 
data sample is extracted from a normally distributed population. This assumption is 
indispensable to conduct several statistical procedures such as the t-test, linear regression 
analysis, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and discriminant analysis (Conover and Iman, 1979).
2
 
Van der Waerden method is carried out to approximate data to normal distribution (Conover, 
1980; van der Waerden, 1927, 1930, 1931; Wright, 2000) based on smoothed ranks. The signed 
ranks are smoothed by converting them to quantiles of the normal distribution
3
 (normal scores) 
using the equation that follows: 
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 Conover, W.J. and Iman, R.L.  (1979). On multiple-comparison procedures. Technical report, Los Alamos Scientific 
Laboratory 
 
2 Krzysztofowicz, R. 1997. Transformation and normalization of variates with specified distributions, Journal of Hydrology, 
197(1-4): 286–292. 
Pohlert, T. 2014. The Pairwise Multiple Comparison of Mean Ranks Package (PMCMR). R package. Available at 
http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=PMCMR 
  
ijA = Normal score of each observation in a variable ( ijx ) 
 ijR x = The ordinary rank where observations of a variable ( ijx ) are ranked in an ascending 
order. 
 
1
ijR x
T
 
 
 
 
= cumulative probabilities of each observation in a variable (
ijx ). Ranks are smoothed 
through the computation of the probability associated with each observation. 
T = Total number of observations in a variable (
ijx ) 
1 = the quantile of the normal distribution is the inverse of each probability given by 
 
1
ijR x
T
 
 
 
 
 
It is worth to note that, the dummy variables are not normalized as the values are binary, taking 
values 1 and 0, therefore they are dichotomous.  
Linearity Test 
The issue of linearity versus nonlinearity is addressed and examined as well (Bahng and Jeong, 
2012; Pao and Chih, 2005). Regression Equation Specification Error Test, RESET (Ramsey, 
1969; Thursby and Schmidt, 1977; Thursby, 1979; Sapra, 2005; Wooldridge, 2006) is employed 
to test the two hypotheses that follow: 
For the test the null hypothesis is 
H0: 


k
1i
tkkitkikktk βα Xy  
And the alternative hypothesis is:  
H1: tkkikkitktk ),β,α,(   Xy f  
where f is any nonlinear function 
The null hypothesis refers to linearity and the alternative refers to nonlinearity.
4
 In case of 
linearity, the OLS estimation condition is fulfilled. In case of non-linearity, the literature includes 
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UR

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F where RSSE and USSE  are the sum squared errors for the restricted and 
unrestricted models respectively, J refers to the two hypotheses under consideration, T is the number of observations, and K is the 
number of regressors. 
different treatments. One treatment is to take the log or natural log to both dependent and 
independent variables (Allen, 1997; Chatterjee and Hadi, 2012)
56
. The researcher of this thesis 
argues that this treatment does not work out as many of the variables take negative values as well 
as many variables are less than one. In case of negative values, the log or natural log do not exist. 
In cases that the variables are less than one, either the log of natural log result in negative values 
which cause distortions to the true relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables. 
Another treatment of the non-linear transformation is to address a polynomial transformation 
when variables might be raised to a power either 2 to address quadratic relationship or 3 to 
address cubic relationship (Berry and Feldman, 1985; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991; McClendon; 
Briand and Carter. 2011)
7
. The researcher of this thesis has chosen to treat the independent 
variables as cubic since it does not cause any change to the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables. The negative values remain negative in cubic form. The same is true in 
case of positive values.  
The RESET test is an approximation to nonlinearity that has been recommended in well-known 
econometric textbooks such as Greene. The objective of the test to approximate to nonlinearity. 
The RESET test follows the F distribution. The results of the RESET test are reported in table 
(4). 
Table (4): The Results of the RESET test: main factors that affect financial inclusion 
Hypothesis Testing Using the F 
distribution 
Data Input 
 J 2 
T 524 
K 5 
SSE-restricted 0.03351 
                                                          
5 Allen, M. P. 1997. Understanding Regression Analysis. Plenum Press, New York.  
 
6 Chatterjee, S. and Hadi, A.S. (2012) Regression Analysis by Example. 5th Edition, Wiley, New York, 98.  
7 Briand, G. and Hill, R. Carter. 2011. Using Excel for Principles of Econometrics. 4th edition, Wiley 
 
SSE-Unrestricted 0.03279 
Alpha (Prob) 5.00% 
Computed Values   
df-numerator 2 
df-denominator 519 
F 5.7136 
Right Critical Values 3.0131 
Decision Reject Ho 
p-value 0.00351 
 
Thus, the independent variable is raised to the power of 3 as way of approximation to nonlinear 
form. 
Heteroskedasticity Test 
Heteroskedasticity refers to varying variances of the error term which causes bias in the statistical 
estimation. The researcher uses Breusch-Pagan test (1979) and Cook-Weisberg (1982,1983) test 
to examine the extent to which the amounts of FDI are heterogeneous.
8
 The standard test runs on 
the square of the error term. The test is run under the hypotheses and the estimation equation that 
follow: 
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H0: “Error variances are all equal (Homoskedastic)” 
H1: “Error variances are not equal (Heteroskedastic)” 
Table (5): The Results of Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity. 
Lagrange Multiplier Test Template 
Data Input 524 
Number of parameters (s) 5 
                                                          
8
 Breusch, T. S., and A. R. Pagan. 1979. A simple test for heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation. 
Econometrica 47: 1287–1294. 
Cook, R. D., and S. Weisberg. 1982. Residuals and Influence in Regression. New York: Chapman & Hall/CRC. 
________________________. 1983. Diagnostics for heteroscedasticity in regression. Biometrika 70: 1–10. 
 
R square 
 
0.00665 
Alpha 5% 
Computed Values   
Degree of Freedom (m=s-1) 4 
Critical Value - Chi square 9.49 
Lagrange Multiplier Test   
 
Chi Square stat 
 
3.4842 
Conclusion 
Do Not Reject 
H0 
p-value 0.48028 
Conclusion 
Do Not Reject 
H0 
 
The results reported in table (5) show that Heteroskedasticity doesn‟t exist. 
Estimation Model 
The general estimating equation of a nonlinear model takes the form of Least Squares Dummy 
Variables (LSDV) that follows. 
k
3
tk k ik itk k tk
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α β  
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   y X  
Where t = 1, …..,n 
k = number of countries in each group. 
tky  = The ratio of Provision for Loan Losses to Net Loans. 
itkX  = Indicators of Financial Inclusion in addition to dummy variables to control for the country 
effects and longevity effects.  
k = Random error term due to the individual effect. 
tk = Random error. 
  
Hausman Test 
The researcher has carried out the well-known Hausman test for determining whether the models 
are subject to Fixed or Random effect.
9
 The results are as follows. Hausman (1978) test is used 
to choose between a fixed or random-effects model. null Hypothesis is that random Effects 
Model is appropriate test. Table (6): Hausman Test Results (Fixed Effect Model vs. Random 
Effect Model). 
 
Chi-square 
statistic 
Chi-
square 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
Prob. 
10.288263 5 0.0675 
 
The results reported in Table (6) show that the null hypothesis is not rejected at 5% significant 
level implying that the model follows random effects. 
  
                                                          
9 Hausman, J.A. (1978), “Specification tests in econometrics”, Econometrica, Vol. 46 No. 6, pp. 1251-1271. 
 
Part 2 
III.2.a Introduction 
In this section we shall run the regression equation on several iterations, we regress the proxy for 
credit risk against the financial inclusion indicators, then in the following iterations we add the 
countries effect and the Longevity effect one at a time. Post observing the outcomes of the 
empirical analysis we shall compare them with the previous literature review to identify whether 
they challenge past scholars' arguments or they support them. However, the longevity effect is 
the latest contribution to the literature and hence it will suffice to only comment on the results in 
this regard.  
This section reports the results of regressing the common indicators of financial inclusion on the 
indicator of banks‟ credit risk. The results are reported in tables (1-14). 
3.2-1 Part One: The Results for the Effect of Indicators of Financial Inclusion on Banks’ 
Credit Risk 
Table (1): Model Summary of the effect of the Main Indicators of Financial Inclusion on 
Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524) 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .253
a
 .064 .055 .00824498 1.180 
a. Predictors: (Constant), 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc, 
Debitcardownershipage15, Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag 
b. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans 
 
Table (2): ANOVA table for the Effect of Indicators of Financial Inclusion on Banks’ 
Credit Risk (N = 524) 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .002 5 0.00048 7.097 .000
b
 
Residual .035 518 0.00007     
Total .038 523       
a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans 
b. Predictors: (Constant), 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc, 
Debitcardownershipage15, Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag 
 
Table (3): The effect of the Indicators of Financial Inclusion on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 
524) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standar
dized 
Coeffici
ents 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Toler
ance VIF 
1 (Constant) 
.008 .000   
17.16
8 
.000     
Savedatafinancialinstitutionage
15 -.031 .022 -.138 
-
1.372 
.171 .178 5.629 
Debitcardownershipage15 
.009 .003 .211 3.633 .000 .535 1.870 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstituti
onage15 
.022 .065 .033 .343 .732 .191 5.239 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstituti
onorusedacreditcardinlaborforc
eag 
-.041 .015 -.961 
-
2.667 
.008 .014 7.904 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstituti
onorusedacreditcardoutoflaborf
orc 
.174 .073 .855 2.372 .018 .014 7.967 
a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans 
 
 
 
 
3.2-2 Part Two: The Results for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and 
Country Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk 
Table (4): Model Summary of the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and Country 
Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524) 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .662
a
 .438 .413 .00650032 1.592 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Yemen, Libya, Djibouti, Oman, Qatar, Syria, 
Morocco, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, KSA, Malta, Tunisia, Jordan, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc, Algeria, 
UAE, Egypt, Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Debitcardownershipage15, Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag, Israel 
b. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans 
 
Table (5): ANOVA table for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and Country 
Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524)  
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .016 23 0.00072 16.977 .000
b
 
Residual .021 500 0.00004     
Total .038 523       
a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Yemen, Libya, Djibouti, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Morocco, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, KSA, Malta, Tunisia, Jordan, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc, Algeria, UAE, 
Egypt, Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15, Debitcardownershipage15, 
Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag, Israel 
 
 
 
 
 
Table (6): The effect for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and Country Effects 
on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 0.0041 0.0013   3.0661 0.0023     
Saved at a 
financial 
institution 
age15 
-0.0383 0.0438 -0.1734 -0.8740 0.3825 0.0285 5.0525 
Debit card 
ownership 
age15 
0.0044 0.0048 0.0984 0.9144 0.03610 0.0971 8.3032 
Borrowed 
from a 
financial 
institution 
age15 
0.0854 0.1213 0.1282 0.7036 0.4820 0.0338 9.5776 
Borrowed 
from a 
financial 
institution or 
used a credit 
card in labor 
force 
-0.0261 0.0409 -0.6169 -0.6377 0.05240 0.0012 3.4219 
Borrowed 
from a 
financial 
institution or 
used a credit 
card out of 
labor force 
-0.0533 0.2671 -0.2617 -0.1994 0.8420 0.0007 2.7141 
Algeria 0.0049 0.0016 0.1647 3.0431 0.0025 0.3836 2.6071 
Bahrain 0.0048 0.0039 0.1167 1.2365 0.2169 0.1262 7.9268 
Djibouti 0.0119 0.0040 0.1057 2.9934 0.0029 0.9011 1.1098 
Egypt 0.0029 0.0016 0.1021 1.8298 0.0679 0.3608 2.7714 
Iraq 0.0123 0.0020 0.2641 6.0222 0.0000 0.5840 1.7123 
Israel 0.0264 0.0335 0.8724 0.7878 0.4312 0.0009 9.8204 
Jordan 0.0074 0.0017 0.1985 4.3553 0.0000 0.5406 1.8498 
KSA 0.0016 0.0021 0.0405 0.7999 0.4241 0.4371 2.2877 
Kuwait 0.0092 0.0041 0.2085 2.2551 0.0246 0.1314 7.6100 
Libya 0.0192 0.0040 0.1708 4.8321 0.0000 0.8987 1.1127 
Malta 0.0086 0.0067 0.2154 1.2803 0.2010 0.0397 5.2128 
Morocco 0.0048 0.0021 0.1006 2.3162 0.0210 0.5957 1.6788 
Oman -0.0015 0.0030 -0.0194 -0.5120 0.6088 0.7861 1.2721 
Qatar -0.0014 0.0027 -0.0206 -0.5358 0.5923 0.7621 1.3121 
Syria 0.0142 0.0026 0.2171 5.5192 0.0000 0.7260 1.3774 
Tunisia 0.0061 0.0017 0.1614 3.5403 0.0004 0.5403 1.8508 
UAE 0.0096 0.0028 0.3576 3.4703 0.0006 0.1058 9.4535 
Yemen 0.0890 0.0066 0.4586 13.4146 0.0000 0.9609 1.0407 
a. Dependent Variable: Provision for loan losses / Net Loans 
 
Given the output of table (1), this paper concludes that 6.4% variability in the dependent variable 
can be explained by the independent variables, which is illustrated by the measure of quality of 
fit provided by R squared. As noted by the significance of F test in the output from ANOVA 
table (2), it implies that the regression model is significant in predicting the relationship between 
financial inclusion indicators and credit risk. 
In the attempt to regress the credit risk and financial inclusion indicators, the coefficients' table 
(3) has yielded that "saving at financial institutions" and "borrowed from financial institutions" 
predictor variables are not significant in predicting the relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable. It is also observed that "debit card ownership" and 
"borrowed from financial institutions or used credit card out of labor force" has significant 
positive relationship with credit risk. If these two variables increase, they will increase the credit 
risk with 0.009 and 0.174 respectively. However, the predictor variable "borrowed from financial 
institution or used credit card in labor force" has a significant negative relationship with credit 
risk. Hence, when it increases, it will decrease the credit risk with 0.41. Having that said, it is 
important to mention that the discussion to the results doesn‟t refer to the size of decrease or 
increase in Xs. The discussion focuses mainly on the trend, being negative or positive, and the 
significance. 
It is worth to note that, Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are used to detect collinearity (also 
called multicollinearity) among predictors in a multiple linear regression model (Belsley, et al. 
1980)
10
. High VIFs reflect an increase in the variances of estimated regression coefficients due to 
collinearity among predictor variables, Basically, (VIF) is the quotient of the variance in a model 
with multiple terms by the variance of a model with one term alone. It quantifies the severity of 
multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. We analyze the magnitude of 
                                                          
10 Belsley D.A, Kuh E. and Welsch R.E. (1980) Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity, 
New York: John Wiley & Son. 
multicollinearity by considering the size of the VIF. A rule of thumb is that if VIF is greater than 
10, then multicollinearity is high, (Kutner, 2004)
11
. Moreover, a cutoff of 5 is also commonly 
used (Sheather, 2009)
12
. 
 By adding countries' individual effect on the model, there is an obvious improvement in the 
model in table (4) given by adjusted R squared which increased from 5.5% to 41.3% This 
observation indicates that the country effect is a good predictor to credit risk, which if otherwise, 
the adjusted R square will decrease as a penalty for adding junk predictors to the regression 
equation. It is also observed the STD Error has decrease from 0.00824 to 0.00650 indicating 
model improvement. The output given by ANOVA table (5), the significance of the F test states 
that the regression model is significant in predicting the relationship between financial inclusion 
indicators and countries' effect impact on the credit risk.  
The coefficient table (6) has provided that only the predictor variable "debit card ownership" and 
"borrowed from a financial institution or used a credit card in labor force (≥age15)" are 
significant predictors to the credit risk. Moreover, "debit card ownership" variable have positive 
relationship with the credit risk, however. "borrowed from a financial institution or used a credit 
card in labor force" has a negative relationship with credit risk. As for the countries effect, the 
thesis concludes that the countries the most affected by credit risk caused by financial inclusion 
initiatives are Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and 
Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen.   
The provisions of the empirical analysis prove the argument of Khan (2011), Merhotra and 
Yetman (2015), and Sahay et al (2015). That is financial inclusion can contribute negatively to 
financial stability due to the expansion of the pool of borrowers that blemishes the lending 
standards given by the positive relationship between credit risk variable and "borrowing from a 
financial institution or through a credit card out of labor force". Also they prove the argument of 
Hanning and Jansen (2010) that states that the inclusion of low income groups in the financial 
sector tends to raise the stability of the deposit and loan basis. This is given by the negative 
                                                          
11 Kutner, M. H.; Nachtsheim, C. J.; Neter, J. (2004). Applied Linear Regression Models (4th ed.). McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
12 Sheather, Simon (2009). A modern approach to regression with R. New York, NY: Springer.  
 
relationship between credit risk and "borrowing from a financial institution or credit card in labor 
force". However, it is worth to mention that not all income groups should be financially included 
illustrated in the difference between those in and out of labor force. This is illustrated in the 
positive relationship between credit risk and "borrowing from financial institutions or by credit 
cards out of the labor force". Given the negative relationship between credit risk variable and 
"borrowing from a financial institution or a credit card in labor force". This outcome concurs the 
argument of Lopez and Winkler (2019) that more inclusive banking sector are likely to record 
decreases in credit and borrowers' growth in times of crisis. 
The results also support Berger and Bouwman's (2009) financial fragility-crowding out 
hypothesis and risk absorption hypothesis in the sense of, the higher the liquidity being created 
due to the demand on cash and withdrawals the more banks are prone to risks. This could be 
demonstrated in the positive relationship between the credit risk variable and "debit card 
ownership variable". The positive relationship between the credit risk and "the debit card 
ownership" justifies the outcome of the research conducted by Castellanos, Henrnandez, 
Mahajan, and Sierra (2018), whereas providing credit cards to "new to bank" borrowers results in 
substantial risk. This is linked to debit cards as the issuance of credit cards is collateralized 
against a saving account associated with a debit card. It also supports the argument of Awad and 
Eid (2018) on the redistribution of credit towards new borrowers' segments comes with a cost at 
the account of financial intermediary efficiency illustrated in high screening and information 
costs.  
The impact of credit risk due to the emergence of financial inclusion on the chosen sample of 
countries could be justified through several hypotheses mentioned in the literature review. The 
increase in credit risk in countries could be associated with Kjosevski and Petkovski's (2016) 
argument on the variation of the NPL due to the negative correlation with GDP. Moreover, the 
inflation rate has demonstrated a negative correlation with the NPL, while the lending interest 
rate has demonstrated a positive correlation with NPL, the same case for unemployment. The 
empirical analysis on countries effect can be further explained by Bhattarai (2017), that NPL 
could be altered by banks' performance metrics such as ROE, bank efficiency and loans 
categories. Furthermore, the increasing credit risk could be justified by Pearce (2011) that 
financial inclusion in the MENA region faces deficiencies in the financial infrastructure and 
regulations that enforce it. This makes increasing access to finance riskier and costlier for banks. 
3.2-3 Part Three: The Results for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and 
Longevity Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk 
Table (7): Model Summary for the for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and 
Longevity Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524) 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .290
a
 .084 .072 .00817264 1.091 
a. Predictors: (Constant), long6, Debitcardownershipage15, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag, long3, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc 
b. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans 
 
Table (8): ANOVA table for the for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and 
Longevity Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524) 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .003 7 0.00045 6.761 .000
b
 
Residual .034 516 0.00007     
Total .038 523       
a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans 
b. Predictors: (Constant), long6, Debitcardownershipage15, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag, long3, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15, Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc 
  
Table (9): The effect of the Indicators of Financial Inclusion and Longevity Effects on 
Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 0.00896 0.00054   16.48835 0.00000     
Saved at a financial 
institution age15 -0.036 0.02236 -0.16648 -1.64356 0.09088 0.17301 5.77993 
Debit card ownership 
age15 0.010 0.00259 0.23488 4.03779 0.00006 0.52459 1.90624 
Borrowed from a 
financial institution 
age15 0.066 0.06565 0.09960 1.00996 0.031299 0.18253 5.47869 
Borrowed from a 
financial institution or 
used a credit card in 
labor force -0.040 0.01511 -0.97026 -2.71153 0.00692 0.01386 72.12825 
Borrowed from a 
financial institution or 
used a credit card out 
of labor force 0.171 0.07283 0.84146 2.35205 0.01905 0.01387 72.10018 
long3 -0.003 0.00098 -0.14834 -3.34071 0.00090 0.90027 1.11077 
long6 -0.000 0.00099 -0.02066 -0.47386 0.63580 0.93396 1.07071 
a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans 
 
 Adding the dummy variables to control for the longevity effect, it is observed that the model has 
improved given by the increase of the adjusted R squared from 5.5% in table (1) to 7.2% in table 
(7). This is in addition to the decrease in the standard error from 0.0082 in table (1) to 0.0081 in 
table (7). Moreover, 8.4% variability in credit risk is explained by all predictor variables 
represented by the financial inclusion indicators and longevity 3 effect. This is provided by the 
measure of quality of fit R squared in table (7). The output from ANOVA table (8), proves that 
the significance of the F test implies that the regression model is significant in predicting the 
relationship between the financial inclusion indicators, longevity effect and credit risk. As for the 
coefficient's table (9), it is resolved that longevity 3 is significant in this regression equation, 
moreover, it is noticed that there is a negative relationship between the credit risk variable and 
longevity 3 effect given by the negative coefficient. In other words, it will take the finance 
inclusion at least 3 years to reduce the credit risk, which is a long term effect. Post adding the 
longevity effect, two variables that weren't significant in table 3, became significant in table 9. 
These variables are named "saving at financial institution" which has a significant negative 
relationship with credit risk. Meaning if savings at financial institution increased, it will decrease 
credit risk by 0.036. The other variable is "borrowed from financial institution" which has 
significant positive relationship with credit risk. Meaning that if borrowings from financing 
institutions increased, it will increase credit risk by 0.066.  
It is also noted that the statistical analysis supports the stance of Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan 
(2005), Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011), and Han and Melecky (2013) on measuring financial 
inclusion by the wider access to and use of deposits which can improve banks' resilience in times 
of financial traumas. This is given by the negative relationship between credit risk and saving at 
financial institution variable. Furthermore, banks facing stock volatility, increased unusual loan 
commitments, and liquidity risk exposure are alleviated by transaction deposits. 
The empirical analysis argues for the sake of Ghenemi, Chaibi, and Omri (2017) on the 
relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk on banks stability in the MENA region. 
Moreover, the increased credit default works on increasing liquidity risk due to the lowered cash 
inflows. We can perceive out of this analogy, that the increasing cash inflows as an outcome of 
saving at financial institution can control the credit risk. The positive relationship of "borrowing 
from financial institution" and credit risk supports the argument of Khan (2011), Merhotra and 
Yetman (2015), Sahay et al (2015), and Berger and Bouwman (2009). 
3.2-4 Part Four: The Results for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion, Country 
Effects and Longevity Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk 
Table (10): Model Summary for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion, Country 
Effects and Longevity Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524) 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .681
a
 .464 .437 .00636537 1.472 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Yemen, Libya, Djibouti, Oman, Qatar, Syria, 
Morocco, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, long3, KSA, Malta, Tunisia, Jordan, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc, long6, 
Algeria, UAE, Egypt, Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Debitcardownershipage15, Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag, Israel 
b. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans 
 
 
Table (11): ANOVA table for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion, Country 
Effects and Longevity Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524) 
ANOVA
a
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .017 25 0.00070 17.225 .000
b
 
Residual .020 498 0.00004     
Total .038 523       
a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Yemen, Libya, Djibouti, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Morocco, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, long3, KSA, Malta, Tunisia, Jordan, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc, long6, Algeria, UAE, 
Egypt, Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15, Debitcardownershipage15, 
Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15, 
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag, Israel 
 
Table (12): The effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion, Country Effects and Longevity 
Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 0.0042 0.0013   3.1636 0.0017     
Saved at a financial 
institution age15 -0.0445 0.0430 -0.2016 -1.0350 0.3012 0.0284 5.2343 
Debit card ownership 
age15 0.0078 0.0048 0.1762 1.6332 0.0931 0.0925 8.8085 
Borrowed from a financial 
institution age15 
0.1264 0.1191 0.1899 1.0612 0.2891 0.0336 9.7446 
Borrowed from a financial 
institution or used a credit 
card in labor force 
-0.0181 0.0402 -0.4286 -0.4503 0.0527 0.0012 1.2881 
Borrowed from a financial 
institution or used a credit 
card out of labor force 
0.0605 0.2712 0.2972 0.2230 0.8236 0.0006 8.4350 
long3 -0.0039 0.0008 -0.1756 -4.8372 0.0000 0.8167 1.2244 
long6 -0.0008 0.0008 -0.0354 -0.9978 0.3188 0.8534 1.1718 
Algeria 0.0057 0.0016 0.1898 3.5522 0.0004 0.3772 2.6511 
Bahrain 0.0018 0.0040 0.0440 0.4519 0.6515 0.1137 8.7944 
Djibouti 0.0121 0.0039 0.1074 3.1001 0.0020 0.8969 1.1150 
Egypt 0.0036 0.0015 0.1291 2.3446 0.0194 0.3550 2.8168 
Iraq 0.0125 0.0020 0.2685 6.2509 0.0000 0.5834 1.7140 
Israel 0.0034 0.0340 0.1135 0.1009 0.9196 0.0009 3.4067 
Jordan 0.0084 0.0017 0.2256 4.9562 0.0000 0.5199 1.9234 
KSA 0.0015 0.0020 0.0381 0.7608 0.4472 0.4298 2.3269 
Kuwait 0.0070 0.0042 0.1584 1.6768 0.0942 0.1207 8.2869 
Libya 0.0207 0.0039 0.1839 5.2837 0.0000 0.8890 1.1248 
Malta 0.0054 0.0066 0.1362 0.8161 0.4148 0.0387 5.8489 
Morocco 0.0055 0.0020 0.1153 2.7029 0.0071 0.5913 1.6912 
Oman -0.0012 0.0030 -0.0152 -0.4075 0.6838 0.7748 1.2907 
Qatar -0.0008 0.0026 -0.0110 -0.2896 0.7722 0.7531 1.3279 
Syria 0.0154 0.0025 0.2366 6.0942 0.0000 0.7144 1.3997 
Tunisia 0.0065 0.0017 0.1734 3.8595 0.0001 0.5333 1.8753 
UAE 0.0074 0.0028 0.2773 2.6785 0.0076 0.1005 9.9524 
Yemen 0.0890 0.0065 0.4584 13.6924 0.0000 0.9609 1.0407 
a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans 
 
By adding countries' individual effect to the model, an obvious improvement in the model has 
been noticed in table (10) given by the quality of fit the adjusted R squared which increased from 
41.3% in table (4) to 43.7%. It is also observed the STD Error has decrease from 0.00650 to 
0.00636 indicating model improvement. In other words, when the country effect has been added, 
46.4% of the variability in credit risk is explained by financial indicators, countries' effect and 
longevity effect combined. The F significance given by ANOVA table (11) states that the 
regression model is significant in predicting the relationship between financial inclusion 
indicators, longevity and countries' effect impact on the credit risk. Given the coefficient's table 
(12), the thesis concludes that the countries the most affected by the credit risk caused by 
financial inclusion which are Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, 
Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen. The countries should direct their financial regulators to 
accumulate enough reserves for loan losses for at least 3 years to mitigate for the credit risk 
impact when initiating financial inclusive projects. After adding the countries' effect on the 
financial inclusion indicators and the longevity effect, only "debit card ownership" and 
"Borrowed from financial institutions or used a credit card in labor force" are significant in 
predicting the relationship with credit risk. The reason why the significance became exclusive 
only to these two variables is due to the changing conditions in the group of countries tested. 
This can agree with the argument of with Kjosevski and Petkovski's (2016), Bhattarai (2017) and 
Pearce (2011). 
III. Summary  
Summing up the provisions of the empirical analysis, the thesis has come to the conclusion that 
the provision for loan losses to net loans as a proxy for credit risk is significant to some financial 
inclusion indicators namely "Debit card ownership", "borrowed from financial institutions or 
used a credit card in labour force" and "borrowed from financial institutions or used a credit card 
out of labour force". Credit risk turns to have negative relationship with "borrowing from 
financial institution through credit card in labour force". However, when accounting for the 
longevity effect, all financial inclusion indicators became significant in predicting the 
relationship with credit risk, where "saving at a financial institutions" and "borrowed from 
financial institutions or used a credit card in labour force" have a negative relationship with 
credit risk. Post the addition of countries' effect on the longevity effect and the financial 
inclusion indicators, credit risk significance became exclusive to only "Debit card ownership" 
affecting credit risk positively and "borrowed from financial institutions or used a credit card in 
labour force" affecting credit risk negatively. Moreover, initiating financial inclusion through 
formal financial institutions is likely to affect countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen. In this respect, financial inclusion 
will start to have a negative impact on credit risk in 3 years in the above economies which is a 
long term effect. 
 
 
  
 
Chapter Four 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
IV.a Conclusion 
Financial inclusion is aimed at introducing the underserved segment of the community to the 
official financial institutions. It is without doubt that financial inclusion is one of the sustainable 
development goals to raise the poor's living standards by availing banking services that are not 
limited to loan acquisition. In this respect, this study aims at testing the relationship between the 
most used financial inclusion indicators and the ratio of the provision for loan losses to net loan 
as a proxy for credit risk. Using the Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDV) as estimation 
equation for non-linear model, it is found that borrowing from financial institutions or through 
credit card in labor force affects credit risk negatively. Meanwhile debit card ownership affects 
credit risk positively. Applying these results on the MENA region as the thesis's geographic 
scope, the countries the most affected by credit risk as a result of financial inclusion programs 
are Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen. 
Moreover, post the addition of the longevity effect to the regression equation, these countries 
need to accumulate enough reserve for loan losses for at least three years. In the light of having 
two opposing teams in the literature, the thesis is more inclined towards the team supporting 
financial inclusion as having a positive effect on banks' stability but on the long term.         
IV.b Recommendations 
In order to mitigate for the impact of credit risk when initiating financial inclusion programs, 
governments are advised to approach microcredit program in a two tiered fashion, promoting 
productive self-employment by delivering credit to the poor for the purchase of capital input. In 
addition to the this, microcredit should deliver non-credit services such as social development 
programs such as vocational trainings, civil responsibilities and rights, information in health 
areas, and information sharing and monitoring among members. These non-credit services could 
be understood in a more general context hence called, Business Development Services (BDS) 
which creates valuable relationship between the borrowers and the financial institutions. In this 
regards, Grameen bank model sets an example. In order to increase repayment rates and control 
the risk of extending loans under financial inclusion, the design of credit programs for the poor 
based on joint liability through peer selection, peer monitoring, and peer pressure are crucial to 
enhance repayment rates. In addition to this, the efficiency of group dynamics that are shaped by 
social ties and group homogeneity shall increase repayment performances. This is because social 
ties tend to increase social sanctions of peer pressure. Microfinance institutions can generate high 
repayment rates from the borrowers without the need for collaterals and group lending contracts. 
This can be achieved by the threat to refinance a borrower who default on obligation. Another 
tool could be to establish a collateral substitute that could act as an emergency fund. Regular 
repayment schedule can sustain high repayment rates as it works on screening out borrowers that 
are undisciplined at early stages and gives early warning for credit officers about future 
problems.  
Seeing the repercussions of information asymmetry and moral hazard that arise from the 
extension of loans, credit bureaus could be the institutional answer to these problems. 
Information sharing assists the lender in better judging the risk profile of a potential borrower 
and provide incentives to have the borrower pay on time and narrowing the window for the 
former to access credit from other lenders. In this light, Credit Reporting Agencies (CRA's) will 
play a critical role in reducing information asymmetry and moral hazard by allowing more 
suitable interest rates and reflecting the actual risk of the individual borrower. Banks are also 
advised to alter their credit reporting regime by including full-file comprehensive reporting 
rather than negative only reporting. The former is said to widens credit opportunities to the 
private sector.  
Credit Guarantee companies (CGC's) is considered to be a solution to enhance access to finance. 
CGC's are able to provide guarantees for MSME's without collaterals or track records to seek 
funding opportunities. They also cover a percentage of the risk besides their ability to remedy the 
financing gap which distinguishes economies in transition from other economies, that is the lack 
of usable collaterals. From a different perspective, financial inclusion and stability should be 
treated in a nexus where they should be healed by synergies rather than trade-offs. While 
financial openness instigates trade-offs between financial inclusion and stability, fiscal freedom, 
education, and deepening the credit information system should generate synergies between 
financial inclusion and stability.  
One important factor that can contribute to the successful emergence of financial inclusion, is the 
overhauling of financial infrastructure. This could occur by enforcing transaction laws and the 
establishment of unified collateral registries. Moreover, it is recommended to remove interest 
caps, which should happen in a way that should not overlap with the general local economy. 
Furthermore, enhancing consumer protection against exploitative practices such as excessive 
fees on overdraft, lack of consumer redress and the miss-sell of financial products. 
Countries challenged by low financial inclusion could gain from Fintech lending. This end could 
be achieved by deploying machine learning based credit rating that can bring significant 
disruption in the credit market. In this light, Fintech can reduce the time for credit decision and 
generate lower loan rates to existing borrowers.             
The bank account information model could be deployed to improve default prediction. The 
model will be able to reduce credits costs and review times, furthermore, it won't be manipulated 
nor altered by the information provider for the purpose of tax returns or loan application. The 
emergence of such model will allow bank to calculate the loan's upper limit and in addition of 
having a grasp of the annual cash flow of the borrower, the bank will be able to make precise 
estimates of the amount a borrower can repay.  
For banks to control defaults rates, banks are advised to increase the minimum payment which 
could reduce debt and further facilitating repayment burdens. However, policymakers will have 
to be cautious as increasing the minimum payment may have a double edged effect. The 
downside to this policy is that it tightens the short-run liquidity constrains which in its turn can 
increase the default rates. 
IV. c Future Research 
In the light of the above, seeing that a lot of the micro-finance practices can be used to control 
repayment rates and hence stabilize credit risk. The researcher shall further examine the impact 
of these practices on controlling credit risk when initiating financial inclusion projects 
empirically. Moreover, how these practices could be mainstreamed as part of the banks 
operations to enhance their stability and advance financial inclusion in their different economies.   
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